, multidisciplinary symposia (International Sociological Association, 1957;  Kahn and Boulding, 1964; McNeil, 1965; Ciba Foundation, 1966; Stagner, 1967) , and numerous theoretical works by representatives of several disciplines. Since Hager et al. (1956) argue that the effort to understand religious conflicts in the same framework as ethnic and racial conflicts, as recommended by Williams (1947) , had failed because of certain fundamental peculiarities of religion and religious groups. Similarly, Janowitz (1957) argues that the effort to If taken to the extreme, emphasis on the uniqueness of special cases becomes indis-tinguishable from an idiographic approach to knowledge, which holds that &dquo;true knowledge is of particulars&dquo; (K. Singer, 1949a ). Aron (1957) Merton's (1957 Merton's ( , 1967 view that empirically testable &dquo;theories of the middle range&dquo; are the immediate task of sociological research, together with the assertion that a theory of class conflict is a middle range theory (Dahrendorf, 1959, p. x). Merton (Merton, 1967, p. 52 This objection is deprived of some of its force, however, by the fact that the concept of &dquo;middle range theory&dquo; is somewhat ambiguous, and can be used equally well to justify a general theory of conflict. Merton himself suggests this possibility when, in order to illustrate one main characteristic of middle range theories (i.e., they are &dquo;sufficiently abstract to deal with differing spheres of social behavior and social structure, so that they transcend sheer description or empirical generalization&dquo;), he points to &dquo;the theory of social conflict [which] has been applied to ethnic and racial conflict, class conflict, and international conflict,&dquo; as a typical example (Merton, 1967, p. 68 ( Coleman, 1957) , international conflict North et al., 1960) , revolution (Davies, 1962; Johnson, 1966; Tanter and Midlarsky, 1967) , war and revolution (Timasheff, 1965) , or intra organization conflict (Beals and Siegel, 1966; Goldman, 1966 Merton (1967, p. Sorokin (1928, p. 327; 1947, p. (Boulding, 1962, p. 213 (Simmel, 1955; Coser, 1956 ), intraparty and interparty conflict (Mack and Snyder, 1957) , conflict within a social unit and conflict between social units (Levinger, 1957) , or internal conflict (&dquo;quandaries&dquo;) and conflicts between parties (Boulding, 1957) [Galtung, 1965b, p. (Simpson, 1937, p. 41), the logical structure of the conflict situation (Rapoport, 1965, p. (Sorokin, 1928 (Sorokin, , 1947 (Sorokin, , 1966 K. Singer, 1949a K. Singer, , 1949b Bernard, 1957b (Sorokin, 1928; Bernard, 1950; Coser, 1956 Coser, , 1967 Dahrendorf, 1959 Dahrendorf, , 1967 Horowitz, 1962) . As Angell (1965) (Novicow, 1896) , and L'Opposition Universelle ( Tarde, 1897) . General theories of social conflict appeared in the works of Tarde (1899), Simmel (1903) , Carver (1908 Carver ( , 1915 Cooley (1918) , Park and Burgess (1924) , Ross (1930) , Von Wiese and Becker (1932) , MacIver (1937) , Lundberg (1939) , and Sorokin (1947) , and in general treatments of conflict by Lasswell (1931) , Simpson (1937) , Lewin (1948) , K. Singer (1949b Singer ( , 1949c , Wright (1951) , Chase (1951) , Lawner (1954) ( 1954, 1957a, 1957b, 1960, 1965 ) , Mack and Snyder (1957 ), Boulding (1957 , Dahrendorf (1958 ), Schelling (1958 , 1960 , Rapoport (1960 Rapoport ( , 1965 , Galtung (1959, 1964, 1965a, 1965b) , Rex ( 1961 ) , DeKadt ( 1965 ) , Thurlings ( 1965 ) , Beals and Siegel (1966) , Coser (1967) Richardson's (1960a Richardson's ( , 1960b (Bernard, 1960) .
In a more recent review, Bernard (1965) presents a modified classification of theoretical approaches which corresponds more exactly to Rapoport's trichotomy. Viewing theories of conflict historically, she treats the various frameworks as competing &dquo;paradigms&dquo; (Kuhn, 1962) . The (1) the &dquo;neo-strategic model&dquo; (Schelling's [1958, 1960] transformation of game theory into a theory of social interaction) ; (2) the &dquo;nonstrategic model&dquo; (Richardson's arms-race models as modified by Rapoport [1960] and Boulding [1962] (Hager, 1956; Dodson, 1958 Dodson, , 1960 Hines, 1966) , industrial conflicts (Kerr, 1954; Dubin, 1957; Friedland, 1961) , ritual conflicts in A f rican societies ( Gluckman, 1954 ( Gluckman, , 1955 , intertribal war in Brazil (Murphy, 1957) , international conflicts (North, Koch, and Zinnes, 1960; Rosenau, 1964; Timasheff, 1965) ( Sorokin, 1928) Wright, 1951; Coser, 1956 Coser, , 1964 Mack and Snyder, 1957; Bernard, 1957a; Boulding, 1957) , &dquo;tension&dquo; (Bernard, 1957b ), &dquo;religious conflict&dquo; (Coleman, 1956) Williams, 1947; Mack and Snyder, 1957; Timasheff, 1965) ; but sometimes competition is regarded as a species of conflict (Simmel, 1955; Dahrendorf, 1961) , or conflict is regarded as a species of competition (Lasswell, 1931; Boulding, 1962 Cooley, 1930; Ross, 1930; Von Wiese and Becker, 1932; Lundberg, 1939; Ogburn and Nimkoff, 1942; Bernard, 1949; Davis, 1949; Young, 1949; and many others); in major reference works such as the Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (Lasswell, 1931; Hamilton, 1931) (Coser, 1964; Friedsam, 1964) ; and in both general and special theoretical or review essays (e.g., Williams, 1947; Wright, 1951; Kerr, 1954; Coser, 1956 Coser, , 1967 Bernard, 1957a Bernard, , 1960 Boulding, 1957; Angell, 1965; Mack, 1965; Timasheff, 1965; Gross, 1966; and many (Carver, 1908 (Carver, , 1915 MacIver, 1937 MacIver, , 1942 Simpson, 1937; Weber, 1947; Chase, 1951; Simmel, 1955; Lawner, 1956; Levinger, 1957; Aubert, 1963; Beals and Siegel, 1966; Nicholson, 1967; and many Schelling (1958 Schelling ( , 1960 , Rapoport ( 1960 ) , Rex (1961) , Boulding (1962) , Berelson and Steiner (1964) , Galtung (1965b) , Thurlings (1965) , Johnson (1966) , Loomis (1967) Levinger (1957) , North et al. (1960) , Boulding (1962) , Aubert (1963) , Galtung (1965b) The degree to which the choice is between terminological systems rather than conceptual systems is illustrated in two statements by Wright (1951 Wright ( , 1965 North et al., 1960) , latent conflicts from manifest conflicts (DeKadt, 1965) , or &dquo;conflict topics&dquo; from &dquo;conflict cycles&dquo; (Goldman, 1966 (Wright, 1951) . But some of them treat rivalry as a form of conflict (Park and Burgess, 1924) , and many fail to exclude it explicitly. On the other hand, some of these writers distinguish additional species of struggle which are not explicitly excluded by Mack and Snyder, such as controversy (Ross, 1930) , contravention (Von Wiese and Becker, 1932), opposition ( Von Wiese, 1941; Gross, 1966) , contest (Coser, 1956) , or antagonism (Gross, 1966 Beals and Siegel (1966) (Coser, 1964; Friedsam, 1964) Zadrozny (1959) . It also occurs in the Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences ( 1931; articles by Hamilton and Lasswell) , and in works by other writers such as Williams (1947) and Davis (1949) . But there are many other writers who do not base the distinction on regulation, some explicitly stating that both conflict and competition can be either regulated or unregulated (e.g., Park and Burgess, 1924; Ross, 1930; Von Wiese and Becker, 1932; Lundberg, 1939; Bernard, 1949; Wright, 1951; Kerr, 1954; Angell, 1965; Timasheff, 1965) .
Among writers who define conflict more broadly, the parallel distinction is between &dquo;competition&dquo; and other forms of conflict.
In most of these schemes, competition is not distinguished by the criterion of regulation (e.g., Carver, 1915; Simmel, 1955; Weber, 1947; MacIver, 1937; Lawner, 1956; Levinger, 1957; Dahrendorf, 1961; Aubert, 1963; Beals and Siegel, 1966 [Hamilton, 1931, p. [Davis, 1949, p. [Friedsam, 1964, p. [Davis, 1949, p. 162].
A football game played normally according to the rules is competition until one or more players begin to assault one another in a manner forbidden by the rules; then it becomes a conflict [Mack and Snyder, 1957, p. Levinger, 1957; Dahrendorf, 1961; Aubert, 1963; Beals and Siegel, 1966) .
Still other writers focus on interaction patterns, but their distinctions are ambiguously related to the directness or indirectness of the struggle. For example, Park and Burgess (1924, p. (e.g., Lasswell, 1931; Lawner, 1956; Zadrozny, 1959; Angell, 1965) Ross, 1930; Lasswell, 1931; Von Wiese and Becker, 1932; Williams, 1947; Wright, 1951; Boulding, 1957; Mack and Snyder, 1957; Zadrozny, 1959; Timasheff, 1965 ), but many others merely imply it, and there are a few dissenters (e.g., Bernard, 1957a; Dahrendorf, 1961) Cooley, 1930; Williams, 1947; Timasheff, 1965) or else that competition is always conscious (Zadrozny, 1959 [1930, p. 166].
The same idea is contained in various phrases like &dquo;the focus is upon reaching a goal rather than removing competitors&dquo; (Williams, 1947, p. 43), or &dquo;attention is focused chiefly on reward rather than on the competitor&dquo; (Young, 1949, p. 64 (Williams, 1947; Coser, 1956 Coser, , 1964 (Mack, 1965 Similarly, most broader conceptions of conflict (from Carver, 1915, to Stagner, 1967) which include conflicting interests or incompatible goals among the defining elements, assert that object-centered motivation is primary in all conflicts.
There are exceptions to this, since a number of writers do indeed distinguish forms of (noncompetitive) conflicts which are basically opponent-centered. This is true of types of conflict in which &dquo;an initial hostility, rather than the attainment of a prize, motivates the fight&dquo; (Simmel, 1955, p. 60); of cases in which the predominant motivation is &dquo;fundamental and conditioned&dquo; (Sorokin, 1947, pp. 96-97), &dquo;unrealistic&dquo; (Williams, 1947, pp. 40-41) , or &dquo;nonrealistic&dquo; (Coser, 1956, pp. 49-50) ; and of such types as &dquo;interaction conflict&dquo; (Boulding, 1957, p. 132), &dquo;fights&dquo; and &dquo;debates&dquo; (Rapoport, 1960) , &dquo;dichotomous conflicts&dquo; (Van Doom, 1966 ) and &dquo;threat conflicts&dquo; (Nicholson, 1967 (Lawner, 1956 ). Bernard (1949) [Simmel, 1955, pp. Other definitions of competition also emphasize scarcity (e.g., Doob, 1952; Friedsam, 1964) , and a number of definitions of conflict emphasize incompatibility or mutual exclusiveness of values or aims (e.g., Lasswell, 1931; North et al., 1960; Berelson and Steiner, 1964; Galtung, 1965b; Loomis, 1967 Carver, 1915; Coser, 1956 Coser, , 1964 Mack and Snyder, 1957; Stagner, 1967) . Lundberg (1939) Deutsch, 1956; Levinger, 1957; Dahrendorf, 1959; Boulding, 1962; Timasheff, 1965 
